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EQUITABLE TOLLING OF STATUTORY
BENEFIT TIME LIMITATIONS: A
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT ANALYSIS
Abstract: Courts toll time limitations that limit a statutory right to sue when tolling is
consonant with congressional intent. Courts have left open, however, whether to extend
this congressional intent analysis to toll time limitations that limit a statutory right to
receive a benefit. This Comment analyzes how the United States Supreme Court's 1988
decision in INS v. Pangilinan affects the power of courts to equitably toll time limitations
limiting the application period for a statutory benefit. The Comment concludes that these
benefit time limitations should be tollable when they are consonant with congressional
intent.
In enacting statutes creating public rights or benefits, Congress
often imposes time limits on the right of beneficiaries to apply for
those rights or benefits. By invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling,
courts may permit plaintiffs to apply for a benefit after expiration of
the statutory time period, if those plaintiffs have been denied the right
to apply for the benefit due to inequitable governmental conduct.
Courts are often thwarted in their attempts to grant equity, however,
because the Supreme Court has consistently refused to equitably estop
the government' and because preclusive, formalistic equitable tolling
rules hinder the courts' analyses.
Courts analyze and categorize benefit time limitations by analogiz-
ing to statute of limitation analysis. Benefit time limitations are unlike
statutes of limitation, however, in that they do not limit a right to
bring suit in court.2 Moreover, analysis of statutes of limitation has
always been problematic for courts.3 Analyzing benefit time limita-
tions by analogy to statutes of limitation confuses the differences
between benefit time limitations and statutes of limitation, and com-
pounds the analytical problems related to statutes of limitation.
Several federal courts recently have examined equitable tolling ques-
tions in the context of two immigration benefit statutes. These courts
each classified the limitation differently, using different analyses. The
Supreme Court, in INS v. Pangilinan,4 implied, in dicta, that courts
1. See, eg., INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (eighteen month delay by INS in
processing immigration visa does not meet standard of aflirmative misconduct necessary to estop
the government). See generally Note, Unauthorized Conduct of Government Agents: A Restrictive
Rule of Equitable Estoppel Against the Government, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1026 (1986).
2. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
3. See, eg., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944) (discussing various
approaches to statutes of limitation that defy logic).
4. 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
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are powerless to toll benefit time limitations like the one in the Nation-
ality Act of 1940.' Several district court judges examined a similar
time limitation in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.6
Two district court judges permitted tolling, while a third judge denied
tolling, after finding that the limitation was jurisdictional.7
Courts can best serve equity by substituting congressional intent
analysis for an approach that analogizes benefit time limitations to
statutes of limitation. A congressional intent analysis would promote
equity8 and ensure that Congress' purpose in enacting the statute is
not frustrated.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
A. Equity Jurisprudence
Equitable tolling, like all equitable remedies, emerged as the "equity
courts" response to injustices resulting from decisions of the "law
courts" in cases involving inequitable conduct.' Equity courts found
that while equity generally was bound by time limitations, and "fol-
lowed the law," equity would not permit defendants to take advantage
of their own wrong.' °
B. Elements of Equitable Tolling
Before a court may invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, it must
find an inequitable event and a tollable time limitation.
1. Equitable Tolling Requires an Inequitable Event
Courts will toll a statute of limitation only upon finding an inequita-
ble event that prevented plaintiff's timely action." Courts consider
plaintiff's otherwise late action to be timely because time limitations
do not run while the inequitable event prevented the plaintiff from
5. Id. at 2215-16.
6. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a (West Supp. 1988).
7. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
9. See generally I J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 16-17. 51 (5th ed. 1941): J.
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 529 (2d ed. 1892).
10. Hovendale v. Amnesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 607, 630 (1806) (Lord Redesdale found that equity
follows the law in all legal questions); Booth v. Lord Warrington. 4 Bro. P. C. 163 (1714) (House
of Lords held that suit not barred by statute of limitation at equity because of defendant's fraud),
noted in J. BRUNYATE, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS IN EQUITY 8, 9, 23-35 (1932).
11. See Anderson v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 619 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (discussing
factors that give rise to equitable tolling); Aljadir v. University of Pa., 547 F. Supp. 667, 670
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (time limitation not tolled because no inequitable event found). aff'd. 709 F.2d
1490 (3d Cir. 1983).
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acting.' 2 Courts find inequitable events where a defendant's conduct
justifiably misleads a plaintiff, 13 where a plaintiff's disability prevents
exercise of the right within the time limitation, 14 or where some exter-
nal source, such as war, "closes" the courts to a plaintiff. 5 Thus, toll-
ing allows courts to remedy situations where the injustice of barring
prosecution of a stale claim outweighs the injustice done to the defend-
ant by permitting the claim.16
2. Equitable Tolling Requires a Tollable Time Limitation
The second prerequisite to equitable tolling is a determination by
the courts that the time limitation is a kind that is tollable according
to common law or statute.17 Because there is little case law on benefit
time limitations, when deciding whether to toll, courts often reason by
analogy to statutes of limitation. Thus, the same factors that preclude
tolling statutes of limitation may preclude tolling benefit time
limitations.
12. Courts reconstruct time limitations in three ways, depending on when the inequitable
event occurred. Courts "postpone" the commencement of the time limitation if the inequitable
event occured before the period began. See, eg., Cerbone v. International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendant's fraudulent concealment postponed time
limitation). Courts "suspend" time limitations already commenced. See, e.g., Boag v. Chief of
Police, 669 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's imprisonment suspends running of time
limitation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982). Courts "revive" time limitations already expired,
upon defendant's acknowledgement of the plaintiff's cause of action. See, e.g., United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., v. Great Am. Indus., 479 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (defendant's acknowledgement revives time limitation and removes bar); see also Note,
Developments-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1254-60 (1950) [hereinafter
Developments].
13. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1984) (fraudulent concealment);
Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 614 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Mass. 1985) (duress), appeal denied, 782 F.2d 313
(1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037 (1987). The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is
attributed to Baily v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1875) and Holmberg v. Almbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (doctrine of fraudulent concealment is to be read into every federal statute).
See also Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court. Toward a More Disparate Standard?,
71 GEO. L.J. 829 (1983); Annotation, Effect of Fraud To Toll the Period for Bringing Action
Prescribed in Statute Creating the Right of Action, 15 A.L.R.2D 500 (1951).
14. See, eg., Brown v. Bigger, 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980) (imprisonment); Origet v.
Washtenaw County, 549 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (infancy).
15. See, e.g., Chardon v. Fomero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (pendency of suit in state court
tolls time limitation for action subsequently brought in federal court). See generally Comment,
Does War Toll Statutes of Limitation?, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1140 (1957).
16. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (protection of defendant
frequently outweighed by justice to plaintiff's rights).
17. The second equitable tolling prerequisite of a tollable time limitation can be inferred from
a refusal by courts to toll certain types of time limitations. See, e.g., Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d
549 (7th Cir. 1977) (making distinction between types of time limitations in conflicts of law), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1978); Miers v. Central Mine Equip., 604 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Neb. 1985)
(contrasting tollable and nontollable time limitations).
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Historically, two rules prevented equity from intervening to toll
statutes of limitation. First, the doctrine of sovereign immunity pre-
vented courts from tolling statutes of limitation in statutes that waive
the government's immunity from suit.i" Second, the orthodox substan-
tive-procedural analysis that differentiated between right and remedy' 9
prevented courts from tolling substantive statutes of limitation.2"
Recently, courts have begun to adopt an analytical approach that
looks to the congressional intent behind the statute to determine
whether the statute of limitation may be tolled.2'
a. Jurisdictional Statutes of Limitation Are Not Tollable
The government cannot be sued unless it expressly waives its sover-
eign immunity,2 2 usually by a statute creating a right to hold the gov-
ernment liable.2 3 If a plaintiff does not meet all of the prerequisites for
suit under the statute, sovereign immunity deprives the court of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.2 4 Therefore, statutes of limitation that limit
the time during which actions may be brought against the federal gov-
ernment are "jurisdictional," rather than "substantive" or "proce-
18. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. See generally 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3655 (2d ed. 1985).
19. In a recent article reexamining the origin of the substantive-procedural dichotomy,
Professor Risinger convincingly argues that while the right-remedy distinction originated in the
13th century, the substantive-procedural distinction did not exist until the 18th century.
Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 190-93 (1982). But
see Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH L. REV. 392. 396-401
(1941) (tracing the substantive-procedural dichotomy to a Parlement of Paris case in the 13th
century). Under the original 18th century substantive-procedural dichotomy, as conceived by
the political philosopher Jeremy Bentham, all time limitations were substantive rather than
remedial. BENTHAM, COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: OF LAWS IN GENERAL 137
(Hart ed. 1970). Risinger faults 19th century commentators for fusing the two theories, and
developing the theory that time limitations are procedural rather than substantive. Risinger,
supra, at 193-97.
20. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
22. See Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317. 320 (3d Cir. 1976) (court refused to toll time
limitation in statute authorizing a limited waiver of the government's sovereign immunity
because the statutory waiver did not encompass actions that are untimely due to fraudulent
concealment by a third party).
23. The government waives sovereign immunity in "jurisdictional" statutes such as the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982) ("A tort claim against the United States
shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
two years after such claim accrues.").
24. Lee v. United States, 809 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (court lacks jurisdiction because
statute provides exclusive jurisdictional basis).
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dural," because their expiration deprives the court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. 5
b. Substantive Statutes of Limitation Traditionally Not Tollable
Traditionally, courts applied a substantive-procedural analysis,
which was originally developed in and adopted from conflicts of law
jurisdprudence, to decide whether a time limitation could be tolled.26
A statute of limitation was "substantive" if it satisfied either of the two
"specificity test" criteria: 7 One, if the statute of limitation was con-
tained in the statute; 8 or two, if it specifically referred to the statute.29
For example, a substantive statute of limitation would be one where
Congress created the right for railroad workers to sue their employers,
and attached a clause within the statute or in another statute that
required the worker to sue within three years after the cause of action
accrued.30  Because expiration of a substantive statute of limitation
destroyed both the remedy and the statutory right to bring suit, restor-
ing the remedy by tolling the statute of limitation would not restore
the nonexistent right.3 '
"Procedural" statutes of limitation, on the other hand, were those
that did not satisfy either of the two "specificity" test criteria, and
25. Kreiger, 539 F.2d at 321 n.5. This Comment follows the majority rule that
"jurisdictional" statutes of limitation are those in statutes waiving the government's sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., McIntyre v. United States, 789 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (time limitation in
Quiet Title Act when the action is brought against government is jurisdictional and not tollable);
see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
26. In conflicts of law jurisprudence, foreign substantive statutes of limitation were
enforceable in the forum, while the forum's own remedial statutes of limitation controlled. See
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2(C)-(C)(l) (3d ed. 1986); see
also infra note 98.
27. The specificity test is derived from conflicts of law analysis. See id. §§ 3.2(C), 3.2(C)(2) at
57.
28. See, eg., The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886) (time limitation held an absolute bar
where it was contained within the statute creating the right).
29. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904) (limitation is "substantive" where it is in a
different statute, but "directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying
that it qualified the right").
30. The "substantive" time limitation in the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982), is contained within the statute creating liability against certain
employers. Id. § 56. See generally Annotation, Accrual of Cause of Action and Tolling of
Limitations Period of§ 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 16 A.L.R.3D 637 (1967).
31. See Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec., 310 F.2d 271,282 (8th Cir. 1962) ("[W]here a
statute creates a cause of action that did not exist before and at the same time establishes a period
... within which it must be brought, the running of the statute of limitations destroys the very
right itself and thus cannot be tolled for any reason."), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912, cert. denied,
373 U.S. 914 (1963). See generally Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
(discussing cases holding that substantive time limitations are an absolute bar).
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were, therefore, tollable. Courts reasoned that they could equitably
restore the remedy by tolling the time period, and thereby enforce the
surviving right.3 2
c. Congressional Intent Analysis of Substantive Statutes of
Limitation: The Modern Trend
Modern courts analyze equitable tolling cases involving statutes of
limitation by employing congressional intent, rather than the orthodox
substantive-procedural analysis. Beginning in the 1940's, courts began
tolling substantive statutes of limitation when they found that tolling
was consonant with congressional intent.3 3 These courts rejected the
orthodox substantive-procedural analysis. 34 They disagreed with ear-
lier decisions which labeled statutes of limitation satisfying the speci-
ficity test as "jurisdictional" and nontollable, rather than "mere
statutes of limitation."3 5 These recent courts found that limitations
satisfying the specificity test, although substantive, were still statutes
of limitation. Therefore, tolling should apply to them as well as to
procedural statutes of limitation. In 1965, in Burnett v. New York
Central Railroad,3 6 the Supreme Court adopted congressional intent
analysis in an equitable tolling case. In Burnett, the issue was whether
plaintiffs' timely Federal Employers' Liability Act action in state
32. A procedural statute of limitation would exist if, for example, Congress restricts the time
in which a plaintiff could bring a common law nuisance action, rather than limits a statutory
right. See, e.g., Cox v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 665 F.2d 566, 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1982) (the
statute of limitation in Idaho's wrongful death statute is procedural because the wrongful death
statute is subject to Idaho's general two-year tort statute of limitation and does not itself
incorporate a statute of limitation).
33. In Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 919 (1950), the court explicitly tolled the substantive time limitation in § 6 of FELA.
The court concluded that the legalistic substantive-procedural dichotomy could not set aside the
maxim that no one shall profit from his own wrong and that the purposes of Congress should not
be defeated. Id. at 259; see also Westinghouse Elec. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575 (9th
Cir. 1964) (tolling § 4B of the Clayton Act).
34. Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1947) (war tolls both substantive and
procedural time limitations).
35. Nitkey v. Dawes, 151 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1945) (time limitation not tolled because it
was a special condition coupled with the cause of action and was jurisdictional in nature), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946). Until the 1940's, and sporadically since then, some courts have not
used "jurisdictional" in reference to sovereign immunity statutes, but have used "jurisdictional"
in the same sense that most other courts use "substantive." These courts reasoned that statutes
of limitation, as a part of the statute that creates the liability and gives the right of action, are not
"mere statutes of limitation," but instead affect the court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Id.; League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988) (time
limitation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") is jurisdictional rather
than merely a statute of limitation).
36. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
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court, which was dismissed for improper venue, 37 tolled the substan-
tive statute of limitation.38 After analyzing the congressional intent
behind the statute, the Court allowed the plaintiffs' late action.39 The
Court reasoned that the substantive-procedural analysis was not indic-
ative of congressional intent.4°
Courts are split over whether congressional intent analysis, used in
determining if substantive statutes of limitation are tollable, should
also apply to statutes of limitation that might otherwise be classified as
jurisdictional.41 Recently, several courts have tolled statutes of limita-
tion after finding that Congress intended that the particular statute of
limitation, which waived the government's sovereign immunity, could
be tolled. These courts found that Congress intended that the statute
of limitation not be jurisdictional; therefore, the limitation was tol-
lable.4 2 These courts did not, however, hold that a jurisdictional stat-
ute of limitation may be tolled.43 In contrast, other courts, in refusing
to toll jurisdictional time limitations, hold that compliance with each
provision of the statute is necessary before the statute's explicit waiver
of the government's immunity becomes effective, thereby permitting
suit against the government.'
II. "BENEFIT" TIME LIMITATIONS
A. Definition and Problems
Benefit time limitations present courts with unique, unresolved
problems. Benefit time limitations are statutory provisions that limit
37. Id. at 425.
38. Id. at 426, 436.
39. Id. at 432, 436. The Court reasoned that the substantive-procedural dichotomy does not
determine whether the time limitation may be tolled. Id. at 426-27.
40. Id. at 427 n.2. In 1974, the Supreme Court again adopted a congressional intent
approach in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). The issue in American
Pipe was whether a federal court could extend the substantive statute of limitation in § 4B of the
Clayton Act beyond the period established by Congress, where plaintiffs had failed to join a class
action before the limitation period expired. In tolling the limitation, the Court reasoned that
"the proper test is not whether the statute of limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but
whether it is consonant with the legislative scheme." Id. at 554.
41. See, eg., Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986) (congressional intent dictated that the
time limitation in the Social Security Act was not jurisdictional, but a condition precedent to the
waiver of sovereign immunity); Block v. North Dakota ex rel Board of Univ. and School Lands,
461 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1983) (Congress intended the time limitation to be a jurisdictional bar to
late action under Quiet Title Act).
42. See, e.g., Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480.
43. See, e.g., id. at 478.
44. See, eg., Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957) (war does not toll a time limitation
against the government); Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1985) (U.S. government
cannot be estopped nor can principles of equity toll jurisdictional time limitation).
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to a specific period of time a beneficiary's right to receive or apply for a
statutory benefit. 45 Benefit time limitations are different from statutes
of limitation in several important respects. First, benefit time limita-
tions, unlike statutes of limitation, do not limit the time in which a suit
may be brought on a statutory cause of action. Second, statutory
rights to sue, limited by statutes of limitation, are exercised through
the judicial branch, while benefit statutes are exercised through the
executive branch. Third, the policies behind the two types of limita-
tions are different. Statutes of limitation are specifically enacted to
protect defendants from stale claims regardless of the right granted.4 6
The policy behind benefit time limitations varies depending upon con-
gressional intent in granting the particular statutory benefit. Notwith-
standing the important differences between benefit time limitations
and statutes of limitation, courts frequently analyze benefit time limi-
tations by analogizing to statutes of limitation.4" Thus, whether a
court will find a benefit time limitation tollable often depends on the
statute of limitation category to which the court finds the benefit time
limitation most analogous.
A number of recent federal court decisions have considered the ben-
efit time limitations in two different immigration statutes. The
Nationality Act of 1940,4" which allowed Filipino World War II vet-
erans to apply for naturalization under a favorable naturalization pro-
cess, included a benefit time limitation. The Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") 4 9 similarly contained a benefit time
limitation during which illegal aliens could apply for amnesty to legal-
ize their presence in the United States.
45. Certain statutes create a benefit, but limit the time in which judicial action may be
brought if the government denies the benefit. True benefit time limitations limit application for
the benefit itself, and therefore do not involve suit against the government. See, e.g., Bowen, 476
U.S. at 470 (provision limiting time in which to bring court action after denial of social security
benefits).
46. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (the
purpose of time limitations is to uphold the "right to be free of stale claims ... over the right to
prosecute them").
47. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 3-4
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988) (analogizing the IRCA benefit time limitation to statutes of
limitation). See infra note 93.
48. Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed by the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1952, Pub. L. 82-414, § 403(a)(42), 66 Stat. 163, 280), as amended by Second War Powers Act,
Pub. L. 77-507, § 1001, 56 Stat. 182 (1942) (expired by its own terms on Dec. 31, 1946 following
amendment by Act of Dec. 20, 1944, Pub. L. 78-509, 58 Stat. 827).
49. Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended primarily at 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
The time limitation is codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(l)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
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B. Recent Benefit Time Limitation Cases
Courts differ in their opinions on what a benefit time limitation is
and whether it may be tolled. The Supreme Court in INS v.
Pangilinan implied in dicta that benefit time limitations are substan-
tive preclusions to tolling.5" However, three IRCA amnesty cases,
decided after Pangilinan in two federal district courts, demonstrate
that there is still confusion over the power of the courts to toll benefit
time limitations.51 One district court judge found that the IRCA ben-
efit time limitation was simply a statute of limitation.5" A second dis-
trict court judge found that the same benefit time limitation was not a
statute of limitation, but was instead a jurisdictional preclusion to toll-
ing. 3 Finally, a third judge did not classify the IRCA benefit time
limitation, but tolled it on the basis of congressional intent. 4
1. INS v. Pangilinan
In INS v. Pangilinan, 55 the United States Supreme Court held that
courts could not invoke their equitable powers to confer citizenship in
violation of the provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940 ("1940
Act").56 The 1940 Act granted the United States Vice Consul to the
Philippines the authority to accept naturalization petitions.5 When
the Attorney General revoked the Vice Consul's authority, this
deprived Pangilinan and others 8 of the full benefit application time
period authorized under the 1940 Act.5 9 Pangilinan filed naturaliza-
50. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1988).
51. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text. A third court is in the process of
reconsidering whether Pangilinan limits its equitable tolling power. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, No.
88-0625 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1988) (Supplemental Order XI to Ayuda, Inc v. Meese, 687 F. Supp.
650 (D.D.C. 1988)), noted in 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 152-53 (1989).
52. Zambrano v. INS, No. S-88-455 FJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988).
53. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 4 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 1988).
54. Catholic Social Servs., Inc. v. Meese, No. S-86-1343 LKK, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Cal. June
10, 1988; final order Aug. 11, 1988).
55. 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
56. Id. at 2215. See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952) as
amended by Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. 77-507, § 1001, 56 Stat. 182 (1942) (expired 1946).
57. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-853, § 702, 54 Stat. 1137 as amended by Second War
Powers Act, Pub. L. 77-507, § 1001, 56 Stat. 182, 183 (1942).
58. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2212 & n.1 (a total of 16 Filipino veterans brought suit).
59. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-853, §§ 701-705, 54 Stat. 1137 as amended by Second
War Powers Act, Pub. L. 77-507, § 1001, 56 Stat. 182, 182-183 (1942). Section 702 authorized
designation of the INS official. Id., 56 Stat. 183. The 1940 Act instructed the INS to designate
representatives in the Philippines, and other countries, to receive petitions for naturalization
from qualified veterans who had fought for the United States armed forces during World War II.
Id., 56 Stat. 182. After only four months, and more than a year before the December 31, 1946
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tion petitions more than thirty years after the cutoff date.6" The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that it had the equitable power to grant
citizenship to Pangilinan even though the Act had expired.6' The
court also held that the Attorney General's revocation of the Vice
Consul's naturalization authority had violated the mandatory lan-
guage of sections 702 and 705 of the 1940 Act.62 The Supreme Court
reversed.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia held that the Consti-
tution delegates naturalization power exclusively to Congress;63 the
judiciary cannot, through its equitable powers, usurp this power.
Neither by equitable estoppel, "nor by invocation of equitable powers,
nor by any other means does a court have the power to confer citizen-
ship in violation of these limitations."64 The Court found that Con-
gress did not intend veterans eligible under the 1940 Act to be able to
petition after the 1946 cutoff date.6 5 Also, contrary to the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding, the Supreme Court found that section 702 of the 1940
Act authorized, but did not mandate, appointment of a representa-
cutoff date, the Attorney General revoked the Vice Consul's authority. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at
2214.
60. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215.
61. Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1986). The relevant provisions of
the 1940 Act expired by their own terms on December 31, 1946. Act of Dec. 20, 1944, Pub. L.
78-509, § 1501, 58 Stat. 827. Pangilinan was originally litigated and appealed under a number of"
different case names. In Barretto v. United States, 694 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1982), the case that
began the Pangilinan litigation, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's opinion in In re
Litonjua, 511 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Cal. 1981), on the ground that Barretto was collaterally
estopped by the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in Mendoza v. United States, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th
Cir. 1982). However, the Supreme Court later reversed Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984). Thus,
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Barretto because the Ninth Circuit's collateral
estoppel rationale in that case, as based on Mendoza, was no longer valid. INS v. Litonjua, 465
U.S. 1001 (1984). On remand Barretto became Pangilinan v. INS. 796 F.2d 1091 (1986).
62. Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 702 of the 1940
Act provides that the petitions of eligible veterans "'shall be made and . . . filed with, a
representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service designated by the Commissioner."
Second War Powers Act, Pub. L. 77-507, § 1001, 56 Stat. 182 (1942) (amending Nationality Act
of 1940, Pub. L 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137). Section 705 provides that the "Commissioner shall make
rules necessary to carry into effect the Act." Id., 56 Stat. 183.
63. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
64. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2216.
65. Id. In 1948, Congress amended the Nationality Act of 1940, enacting new provisions for
naturalization of persons serving in the armed forces. Act of June 1, 1948, Pub. L. 48-567,
§ 324A(a), 62 Stat 281, 282. However, the Philippines was specifically exluded from these
provisions. Id. The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 incorporated the 1948
amendements and required all subsequent and pending petitions for naturalization to be
adjudicated under the 1952 Act. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. 82-414,
§ 329(d), 66 Stat. 163, 251 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1440 (1982)).
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tive.66 Thus, the government acted properly within its discretionary
powers in prematurely revoking the representative's authority to
receive petitions.67
Although the Supreme Court did not mention equitable tolling, or
rely on tolling cases to support its denial of equitable relief, Pangilinan
appears to limit the power of courts to craft equitable remedies over-
riding the expiration date of a statutory right.68 In the opinion's only
paragraph pertaining to equitable remedies, the Court relied on three
nineteenth century cases to state that "[c]ourts of equity can no more
disregard statutory and* constitutional requirements and provisions
than can courts of law,"69 and "equity cannot ... create a remedy in
violation of the law." 70
2. The Amnesty Cases
Several federal district courts have attempted to resolve the effect of
Pangilinan on equitable tolling in cases involving the benefit time limi-
tation in IRCA.71 IRCA granted illegal aliens satisfying certain crite-
ria 72 the opportunity to apply for legalization in the form of temporary
resident status, adjustable to permanent resident status. 73 The benefit
of legalization was available under the statute only if the eligible appli-
cant applied during the twelve-month period between May 5, 1987,
and May 4, 1988.74 The INS misinterpreted several IRCA provisions,
however, and consequently declared certain aliens ineligible to apply
for amnesty during a substantial portion of the twelve-month IRCA
66. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that no other
inequity deprived respondents of their right to petition under the 1940 Act. The Court reasoned
that while INS representatives moved from country to country in other parts of the world, an
authorized representative continuously existed in the Philippines for eight months. Id. at 2217.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2215-16.
69. Id. at 2216 (quoting Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)).
70. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 122
(1874)). For the same proposition, the Court also cited Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U.S.
550, 555 (1885), and 1 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 19 (W. Lyon ed. 1918). None of
these cases, however, involved a time limitation. See infra note 116.
71. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(1)(A) (West Supp. 1988); see supra notes 51-54.
72. Besides timely application, the alien must establish a continuous unlawful residence in the
United States since January 1, 1982, a continuous physical presence in the United States since
November 6, 1986, and admissibility as an immigrant. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(a)(l)-(4) (West Supp.
1988).
73. Id. § 1255a(b).
74. Id. § 1255a(a)(1)(A). The alien must apply for adjustment to lawful status during the 12-
month period. The period began May 5, 1987 and ended May 4, 1988. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a)(1)
(1988). Certain other illegal aliens, known as Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs), were given a
18-month period to apply for amnesty. 8 U.S.C.A § 1160(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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legalization period.75 Aliens brought suit asking the courts to toll the
application period due to the INS misinterpretations, and to require
the INS to accept late applications so that the aliens would have the
full benefits of the IRCA application period as intended by Congress.76
Despite Pangilinan, two federal district courts, in opinions by three
different judges, allowed applications after expiration of the IRCA
time limitation. The judges differed, however, in their classification of
the time limitation and whether the limitation could be equitably
tolled. In Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese ("CSS"),77 the court
tolled, without classifying, the IRCA time limitation by enjoining the
INS to accept late applications." The court concluded that
Pangilinan should be read narrowly and limited to its factual and stat-
utory context.79 The court did not adopt the Pangilinan language,
which it termed "dicta," that suggested that courts are powerless to
equitably remedy the INS violation. 0 In League of United Latin
American Citizens v. INS ("LULAC"),8 ' the court classified the
IRCA time limitation as jurisdictional and, therefore, nontollable. 2
The court reasoned that by placing timely application as the first
among four eligibility requirements, "Congress expressly made [it] a
jurisdictional provision instead of a statute of limitation, '8 3 the latter
generally being tollable a4 Nevertheless, the court held that because
the plaintiffs were not accorded the full twelve-month period man-
dated by IRCA, their applications were timely.85 Finally, in Zam-
75. Zambrano v. INS, No. W-88-455 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988) (INS violated 8 C.F.R.
245a.l(i)), noted in 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 818 (1988); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal. July 18, 1988) (INS policy codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 245a.2(b)(8)), noted in 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 767 (1988); Catholic Social Servs., Inc v.
Meese, No. S-86-1343 LKK, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 1988) (order holding that INS'
interpretation of the "brief, casual and innocent" absence provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(p)
violated IRCA).
76. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 818 (1988).
77. No. S-86-1343 LKK (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1988).
78. Id., slip op. at 4.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 3. The CSS court reasoned that it was "inconceivable" that Pangilinan has
overturned 200 years of jurisprudence "in the cavalier manner suggested by the Government's
reading of the case," thereby prohibiting equitable remedy in this suit. Id. at 3. The court also
reasoned that such a broad reading of Pangilinan would allow the executive branch to violate
IRCA and "raise very serious" separation of powers questions. Id. at 3-4.
81. No. 87-4757-WDK (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988).
82. Id., slip op. at 4.
83. Id. at 3-4. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction, however, because the
INS had promulgated regulations inconsistent with congressional intent. Id. at 5 n.4.
84. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
85. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 1988). The court also distinguished Pangilinan on three points. First, the Supreme
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brano v. INS, 6 the court tolled the IRCA time limitation after finding
that it was a statute of limitation and not jurisdictional.87 In distin-
guishing Pangilinan, Zambrano agreed with LULAC that Congress
intended plaintiffs to have a full year to apply for amnesty. 8
These three IRCA benefit opinions demonstrate that it is an open
question whether courts will apply a congressional intent,89 substan-
tive-procedural, or jurisdictional analysis to benefit time limitations.
Courts have not resolved whether benefit time limitations are suffi-
ciently like statutes of limitation to be analyzed under a congressional
intent analysis or whether tolling is precluded by application of the
orthodox substantive-procedural analysis. Neither have courts
decided whether benefit time limitations, as limiting benefits granted
by the sovereign, deprive courts of their subject matter jurisdiction.9
III. TOLLING BENEFIT TIME LIMITATIONS: A
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT APPROACH
Courts should determine whether benefit time limitations are tol-
lable by examining congressional intent, rather than by analogizing to
statutes of limitation. A congressional intent analysis would allow
courts to weigh effectively the policy behind the benefit time limitation
against other policies behind the statute in deciding whether the limi-
tation may be tolled.91 The Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Pangilinan does not preclude congressional intent analysis of benefit
Court had not found that the INS had violated the 1940 Act, while the LULAC court found that
the INS violated IRCA. Second, Congress intended to grant plaintiffs the complete 12-month
period in LULAC, while in Pangilinan, Congress intended that the cutoff date be absolute.
Finally, the LULAC court merely granted plaintiffs the right to apply for adjustment of status,
but did not confer citizenship. Id. at 7.
86. No. S-88-455 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988), noted in 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 818
(1988).
87. The Zambrano court granted plaintiffs' relief by enjoining the INS from enforcing its
stricter interpretation of the "likely to become a public charge" IRCA provision. 65
INTERPRETER RELEASES 818 (1988).
88. Zambrano, No. S-88-455 EJG, noted in 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 818 (1988).
89. The modem congressional intent analysis has not been extended to benefit time
limitations. The Supreme Court, in American Pipe, specifically found the time limitations in the
congressional intent line of cases to be statutes of limitation, which create a substantive liability
or right to sue. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974).
90. See, eg., INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (in deciding whether to allow plaintiffs to apply
after the benefit time limitation had expired, Supreme Court did not consider whether tolling was
available).
91. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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time limitations, although it implies that such limitations are subject
to the formalistic, substantive-procedural analysis.92
A. Courts Should Not Analogize Benefit Time Limitations to
Jurisdictional or Substantive Statutes of Limitation
Whether benefit time limitations may be tolled is resolved properly
by looking to congressional intent, rather than by analogizing to juris-
dictional or substantive statutes of limitation.93
Benefit time limitations are not properly analogous to jurisdictional
statutes of limitation, which deprive a court of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, because a statute creating benefits does not waive the govern-
ment's immunity from suit,94 as do statutes creating a right to sue.
95
Whether the statute requires that the benefit time limitation be a
nontollable condition precedent to exercise of the right to receive the
benefit can only properly be ascertained by examining congressional
intent.96
92. This method is characterized by the "specificity test." See supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text.
93. In deciding the remedies available to plaintiffs in LULAC, Judge William Keller, in a
memorandum, directed counsel to submit supplemental memoranda on whether the 12-month
IRCA deadline is "jurisdictional or more akin to a statute of limitation." (copy of Judge Keller's
memoranda on file at Washington Low Review). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
94. Neither the district court in Catholic Social Servs., Inc v. Meese, No. Civ. S-86-1343
LKK (E.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 1988), nor the district court in Zambrano v. INS, No. S-88-455 EJG
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988), found the benefit time limitation in IRCA to be jurisdictional. See
supra notes 77-80, 86-88 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in Pangilinan did not find
that the 1940 Act's cutoff date deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the suit, although it did
find that the cutoff date was a prerequisite to exercising the right. Pangilinan v. INS, 108 S. Ct.
2210, 2215-16. (1988); see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. The only court that found a benefit time
limitation jurisdictional nonetheless held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. See
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 5 n.4 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 1988). The LULAC court's holding, that the benefit time limitation in IRCA was a
jurisdictional preclusion to tolling, is not persuasive. LULAC exemplifies the courts' confusion
over labeling and defining benefit time limitations. The court reasoned that the time limitation is
jurisdictional because it is contained in the same section defining other amnesty eligibility
requirements. Id. at 3. In so reasoning, the court incorrectly applied Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982). In Zipes, the Supreme Court held that the time limitation was not
jurisdictional because it was separate from the provision granting jurisdiction. Id. at 393-94. The
Zipes Court reasoned that the time limitation does not in any way refer to the jurisdiction of the
courts. Id. at 394. There is no indication in Zipes that because a time limitation is part of the
statutory requirement specifying eligibility, it is jurisdictional. Id. at 398. The court implied that
the time limitation would have been jurisdictional if it had been in the jurisdictional section. The
LULAC court seems to have misconstrued the IRCA time limitation as similar to a statute of
limitation and, therefore, jurisdictional.
96. In Zipes, the court-looked to congressional intent in finding that the statute of limitation
was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394-95.
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Analogizing benefit time limitations to statutes of limitation that the
court characterizes as "substantive" is similarly inappropriate. The
orthodox substantive-procedural characterization analysis is a con-
flicts of law doctrine that does not serve any purpose in equitable toll-
ing. By applying the orthodox substantive-procedural analysis, courts
may find that benefit time limitations are a non-tollable, substantive
element of the statutory benefit granted by Congress.97 While this
substantive-procedural approach may be proper in analyzing statutes
of limitation, the analysis does not further any policy behind benefit
time limitations.98 The main policy behind statutes of limitation is to
avoid evidentiary problems resulting from claims brought long after
the cause of action has accrued. 99 In contrast, the policies behind ben-
efit time limitations depend on the benefit granted. Unlike statutes of
limitation, there is no single broad policy behind benefit time limita-
tions to protect defendants from lost evidence and failed memories
caused by stale claims. The government's ability to remember
whether an applicant is eligible depends on the government's filing
capacity rather than its mental capacity, and will not deteriorate over
time."co Therefore, courts should closely analyze congressional intent
to decide whether the benefit time limitation in a given statute should
be tolled.
B. Congressional Intent Analysis Enables Courts To Equitably
Resolve Benefit Time Limitation Cases
Employing congressional intent analysis to determine whether a
benefit time limitation may be tolled will ensure that decisions are
made in accordance with the public policy behind the statutory
benefit, and will restore equity to the doctrine of equitable tolling.
Congressional intent analysis is the appropriate means of resolving
equitable tolling cases involving benefit time limitations because decid-
ing whether such time limitations may be tolled, requires courts to
97. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
98. In conflicts of law, the substantive-procedural characterization approach is a valid means
for differentiating between procedural laws, which control the machinery of the courts, and
substantive laws, which the courts' machinery enforces. See Developments, supra note 12, at
1187. In deciding conflicts of law cases, courts must choose the applicable law to ensure smooth
operation of a forum's judicial machinery while still according the parties their substantive
rights. H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW § 86 (1927).
99. See supra note 46.
100. For example, respondents in Pangilinan are still Filipino World War II veterans, eligible
under the 1940 Act but for the cutoff date. See supra note 59. Aliens satisfying the eligibility
requirements under IRCA are still just as eligible for benefits under IRCA but for the time
limitation. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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balance competing congressional policies within the same statute.' 0 '
When the government has acted inequitably in administering the bene-
fit, one of two congressional policies ultimately will be frustrated.
Courts must choose between permitting late application by excusing
the intended beneficiary's noncompliance with the benefit time limita-
tion, and denying late application by allowing the executive branch to
frustrate the purpose of the statute by placing unwarranted obstacles
in the path of applicants and then refusing to accept late applications.
Permitting the executive branch to implement the law in a manner
that conflicts with congressional intent raises separation of powers
issues. 102 Courts deciding such cases according to congressional intent
could accurately balance the policies behind both the time limitation
that would be violated and the statutory provision violated by the
government.
C. Persuasive Judicial Authority Applies Congressional
Intent Analysis
Most Courts analyzing statutes of limitation and some courts ana-
lyzing benefit time limitations have adopted a congressional intent
approach. While statutes of limitation are different from benefit time
limitations, the reasons courts have applied a congressional intent
analysis in some statutes of limitation cases apply equally in benefit
time limitation cases.
Recently, courts have looked to congressional intent in finding that
an apparently jurisdictional limitation does not deprive the court of
subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, is not jurisdictional."°3
Thus, even if a court finds benefit time limitations sufficiently analo-
gous to jurisdictional statutes of limitation, the court could toll the
benefit time limitation when to do so is consistent with congressional
intent.
101. A few courts have misapplied the congressional intent analysis in statute of limitation
cases. These courts analyzed congressional intent to discover whether Congress intended the
statute to be substantive or procedural when the better analysis would have looked to
congressional intent to discover whether Congress intended tolling to be available. See, e.g.,
Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec., 310 F.2d 271, 283 (1962) (Congress intended § 4B of the
Clayton Act to be a procedural statute of limitation), cert. denied. 371 U.S. 912 (1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). While allowing courts greater flexibility, this misapplication of the
congressional intent analysis still assumes that Congress is aware that time limitations it intends
to be labeled substantive would be an absolute bar. There is no reason to assume congressional
intent when the court could analyze legislative history to ascertain Congress' actual intent.
102. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 5 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 1988).
103. See, e.g., Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
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Several modem courts have abandoned the substantive-procedural
analysis in statutes of limitation cases in favor of a congressional intent
analysis. These courts have reasoned that the substantive-procedural
approach would only be valid in equitable tolling cases if Congress
always intended substantive statutes of limitation to be absolute bars
to late action.1" This reasoning presents persuasive authority for
courts to apply congressional intent in benefit time limitation cases.
The same reasons that persuaded those courts to reject the substan-
tive-procedural analysis and apply congressional intent to substantive
statutes of limitation 10 5 could persuade courts to employ congressional
intent analysis to benefit time limitations. According to the courts'
analysis, Congress, instead of openly stating in the plain language of
the statute that the time limitation may not be tolled, chose to make its
intent known by placing the time limitation within the statute creating
the right.106 The courts thus rejected the substantive-procedural
approach because it did not properly discern whether Congress
intended the limitation to be tollable. 07
Each of the amnesty cases, which decided whether the benefit time
limitation in IRCA could be tolled, have looked to congressional
intent to some degree. The court in Catholic Social Services took the
best approach by looking directly to congressional intent without clas-
sifying the limitation.10 8 By not attempting to classify the IRCA bene-
fit time limitation as a statute of limitation, the court avoided the
formalistic rules controlling whether statutes of limitation should be
tolled. L ULAC also supports a congressional intent analysis.109 While
the LULAC court found that the IRCA limitation was jurisdictional,
104. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 429 n.6 (1965).
105. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 236 U.S. 662, 667 (1915) (statutory
purpose is indicated by the location of the time limitation).
107. The Supreme Court in Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428, explicitly found that the substantive-
procedural dichotomy was not indicative of congressional intent. The courts also faulted the
rationale behind the right-remedy distinction of the substantive-procedural approach. Rights
expire only because some paramount authority refuses to protect the right. It is circular
reasoning to claim that a substantive right has expired, but that the right has expired because the
substantive statute of limitation cannot be tolled. See LeRoy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362,
368 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (recognizing that a right is useless without a remedy).
108. Catholic Social Servs., Inc v. Meese, No. S-86-1343 LKK, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Cal. June
10, 1988; final order Aug. 11, 1988); see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
109. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 12, 1988). Although LULAC found the benefit limitation in IRCA jurisdictional, it seemed
to apply the term "jurisdictional" in the same manner as other courts have applied the term
"substantive." See supra note 35.
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it nevertheless looked to congressional intent in granting the plaintiffs'
late applications. 1 l
IV. INS v. PANGILINAN DOES NOT PRECLUDE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT ANALYSIS
A careful reading of INS v. Pangilinan "' shows that courts are not
restricted in their power to toll benefit time limitations unless tolling
would be contrary to the Constitution and to congressional intent.
Pangilinan does not explicitly mention equitable tolling." 2  The con-
stitutional question, whether courts have the equitable power to confer
citizenship, dominated the Supreme Court's inquiry into equitable
remedies and its reasoning throughout Pangilinan. 3 While the Court
stated that it lacked the equitable power to craft remedies in violation
of statutory limitations, it emphasized that the more fundamental
issue was its lack of equitable power to confer citizenship beyond stat-
utory limitations." 4 The Court reasoned that the 1940 Act consti-
tuted the complete extent of the benefit granted by Congress under its
exclusive constitutional authority."
15
Given the constitutional focus taken by the Court, the Court's asser-
tion that equitable remedies may not override statutory limitations is
dictum unless violation of the statutory limitations also would violate
the Constitution." 6 The Court did not hold that it lacked the power
110. Because the remedy granted in LULAC had the same effect as tolling, and because
ultimately LULAC looked to congressional intent to allow the plaintiffs' late applications,
LULAC at least suggests that a congressional intent analysis should be the main, if not the only,
focus in deciding whether to toll a benefit time limitation.
111. 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
112. Although Pangilinan does not explicitly mention equitable tolling, the Supreme Court's
language restricting the power to provide equitable remedies encompasses equitable tolling. See
supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
113. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215.
114. Immediately following its one paragraph discussion of equitable remedies, the Court
stated: 'More fundamentally, however, the power to make someone a citizen of the United States
has not been conferred upon the federal courts ... as one of their generally applicable equitable
powers." Id. at 2216. Moreover, the cases from which the Supreme Court quoted the maxims
both involved constitutional questions. See Hedges v. Dixon, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (equity
cannot disregard constitutional or statutory requirements any more than can the law); Rees v.
Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 122 (1874) (equity cannot create a remedy in violation of
law), quoted in Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2216. Finally, the district courts in both League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757-WDK, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988),
and Catholic Social Servs., Inc v. Meese, No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
11, 1988) agreed that Pangilinan does not create greater restrictions on the equitable tolling
powers of the courts than existed prior to Pangilinan.
115. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215.
116. Neither Hedges nor Rees involved time limitations or equitable tolling. Hedges. 150 U.S.
at 183; Rees, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 116. Pangilinan also cited Thompson v. Allen County. 115
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to grant equitable relief from a statutory limitation; it merely quoted
maxims to that effect. 17 Furthermore, because the Court did not find
an inequitable event in Pangilinan, 8 the case merely follows the well-
established rule that courts may not toll time limitations unless an
inequitable event prevented a plaintiff's timely action." 9  The
Pangilinan decision is, therefore, consistent with the doctrine of equi-
table tolling by refusing to toll a time limitation where no inequitable
event exists.
The Court in Pangilinan ultimately applied a congressional intent
analysis in holding that the benefit time limitation barred late action.
Pangilinan examined whether Congress intended the courts to have
the power to confer citizenship by naturalization after the benefit time
limitation had expired. 12 0 By applying congressional intent analysis in
connection with its constitutional findings, the Court demonstrated
the importance of analyzing all benefit time limitations according to
congressional intent. Therefore, while Pangilinan does not preclude
jurisdictional or substantive-procedural analysis, neither does it pre-
clude courts from applying a congressional intent analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Without the power to equitably toll benefit time limitations, courts
can only stand by while the executive branch frustrates the will of
Congress by depriving would-be beneficiaries of their statutory bene-
fits. While not all inequitable conduct by the government will be seri-
ous enough to warrant tolling, courts can only determine whether
tolling is precluded by examining congressional intent and carefully
weighing the particular statute's policies. Analyzing benefit time limi-
tations as either jurisdictional or substantive precludes the balancing
necessary to resolve justly equitable tolling cases. A fair resolution of
U.S. 550 (1885). The Thompson Court, in deciding the same issue as Rees, reasoned that the
power to tax is legislative and not judicial. Id. at 557-58. The court in CSS agreed that
Pangilinan is dicta where it suggested that the court is powerless to allow plaintiffs to apply for
amnesty in violation of the IRCA time limitation. Catholic Social Servs., at 3.
117. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215-16; see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. In
tolling the IRCA time limitation the court in LULAC found that granting plaintiffs' relief would
produce no constitutional violation. The court distinguished Pangilinan as a case where tolling
would violate the Constitution. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, at 7.
118. See supra notes 62, 66-67 and accompanying text.
119. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing the lower court's finding that revocation of the
Vice Consul's authority violated the statute and was an inequitable event). The Court did not
find that any other inequity caused plaintiffs' delay. Id. at 2217. See supra notes 11-16 and
accompanying text.
120. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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equitable tolling cases can best be achieved by a congressional intent
analysis.
David D. Doran
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